I. Introduction
Political accountability is one of the cornerstones of good governance and a key topic in academia and development practice. The power of the people to hold political leaders to account is one of the fundamental pillars of representative democracy. Therefore, accountability is central to the most widely used definitions of democracy (e.g. Dahl 1971 Dahl , 1989 Schmitter et al. 1991) .
Moreover, establishing accountable institutions is a top priority on the international development agenda, and singled out as a target of the Sustainable Development Goals (UN Resolution:
A/Res/70/1).
Yet, scholars and practitioners know very little about how and in what sequence accountability sub-types evolve in practice. Arguably, solving that puzzle requires a systematic study of the patterns of long-term historical development across many countries. The present study presents such an approach by investigating the question: Are there generalizable sequences in the evolution of accountability? More specifically, the study focuses on whether certain types of accountability are preconditions for achieving high levels of others.
Scholars from a diverse range of fields employ the concept of accountability with over 100 subtypes and usages attached to it (Lindberg 2013: 204 ). Yet, the underlying etymological principle of allocating authority, appraising performance, and the possibility of applying sanctions, spans across. An established tradition in political science, at least since Locke's (1980 Locke's ( [1690 ) argument, is that accountable leadership requires separation between governors and the governed. This paper is focusing on political accountability in this original sense: When decisionmaking power is transferred from a principal (e.g. the citizens) to an agent (e.g. government), there must be a mechanism in place for holding the agent accountable for their decisions and tools be available for the principal to sanction the agent. Accountability hence is associated with the act of discretionary governing, typically understood as the authoritative allocation of resources and exercising control and coordination (e.g. Dahl 1971; Kooiman 1993; Marsh and Rhodes 1992) . This explains why accountability has always been central to democratic theory, even if there are naturally, types and mechanisms of accountability that have little to do with democracy (in accounting, business relationships, etc.).
Based on earlier work [reference blinded for review: 2] we thus approach political accountability as "constraints on the governments' use of political power through requirements for justification of its actions and potential sanctions." By governments we mean the executive branch of the government including the chief executive: the head of state or government, the cabinet, ministries and top civil servants (Coppedge et al. 2016: 413) . The actors of accountability in this conceptualization are voters, political parties, media, Members of Parliament (MPs), judiciary, and civil society organizations (CSOs). Henceforth, we refer to this meaning simply as "accountability."
We further distinguish between three sub-types of accountability: 1) Vertical accountability captures citizens' ability to monitor and effectively penalize a government through elections and political parties; 2) Horizontal accountability encompasses mechanisms for state institutions to oversee the government; 3) Diagonal accountability refers to civil society and media overseeing the government directly as well as indirectly by enhancing the effectiveness of the other two sub-types [reference blinded for review].
In the literature, we find an intense debate on the sequence of the beginnings of democratization -thus how accountability starts to evolve. For instance, Dahl (1971) argues that competition among elites evolves before the expansion of participation to larger parts of the society. More recently Wilson (2015: 234) finds empirical support for this notion using sequence
analysis. In what sequence high levels of de-facto accountability are reached is less in focus.
To address this gap, we develop a novel theory of the accountability sequence. Building on Dahl's (1971) famous axiom, we argue that governments are more likely to allow for de-facto accountability if the costs of supplying accountability decrease and the costs of suppressing the demand for accountability increase. We argue that progress in vertical and diagonal accountability increases the pressure for horizontal accountability. For instance, the evolution of vertical accountability increases the incentive of MPs to demand for more power and thus de-facto oversight capacity. Conversely, the evolution of high levels of vertical accountability is less dependent on progress in other areas, because voters are not agents in accountability relationships. Furthermore, effective horizontal accountability is more costly for governments because its key actors such as high courts and MPs are relatively close to the power center. Thus, we expect high levels of vertical accountability to develop first and de-facto horizontal accountability to develop last.
Our empirical results support these hypotheses drawing on evidence from 173 countries from 1900 to today. We use the new V-Dem data (Coppedge et al. 2016 a, b) and novel sequencing methods developed by Lindenfors et al. (forthcoming) building on established approaches in evolutionary biology. This allows us to offers a distinctive depiction of sequences between 35 indicators of accountability.
In the next section of the paper we lay out the main theoretical argument. Then follows the presentation of the concept and measurement of accountability. The next section discusses the empirical analysis. A final section concludes the paper.
II. Theorizing Sequences of Accountability
It is established knowledge in political science that order, timing, and historical context matter for the evolution of complex sets of institutions (e.g. Mahoney 2001 , Yashar 1997 . Nevertheless, the existing literature on sequencing has three main shortcomings: 1) it typically focuses on the place and role of one specific institution in a sequential relationship to another (e.g. introducing competition before extending suffrage); 2) it does not employ appropriate methods that can identify a series of variables related sequentially in longer chains; and 3) it usually analyses the dejure introduction of institutions and not their de-facto effectiveness.
For example, several studies of sequencing related to accountability focus on the timing of the introduction of de-jure multiparty elections. On the one side of the argument, Mansfield et al. (2007: 6-7) hold that a premature "out-of sequence" push to hold competitive elections in culturally diverse societies without reasonably effective institutions, is likely to fail and even lead to violence. Others like Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009) also caution against early introduction of multiparty elections suggesting that they stabilize and legitimize dictatorships if introduced before full competition. Contrary to that view, Carothers (2007: 20-21) reasons stable political institutions and accountability mechanisms are more likely to develop "as part and parcel" of the process of democratization rather than separate from it. Similarly Howard and Roessler (2006) and Lindberg (2006) argue that countries holding repeated elections, even if they are held early and in authoritarian contexts, are more successful in democratizing than countries without elections.
Others argues that a powerful legislature must develop first or else a concentration of power in the hands of the executive and underdevelopment of political parties inhibits democratization (Fish 2005) . A case study on the Ukraine supports this notion and shows that even in weak democracies, opposition parties in a legislature can hold the executive somewhat to account through legislative requests (Herron et al. 2015: 132) . On the other hand, scholars have found that conflicts between the legislature and the executive may ultimately lead to democratic breakdown (Stepan et al. 1993) .
Furthermore, establishing a robust and active civil society is often viewed as a precondition for the subsequent fall of authoritarian regimes, as well as for building a resilient democracy (Bernhard 1993) . Carothers (2007: 20) points out that the development of strong grass root movements (e.g. Solidarity in Poland, the African National Congress in South Africa) have often been necessary conditions for democratic change in many countries. Yet, the "moderation argument" (Bermeo 1997) poses that mass popular action needs to be curbed around the moment of transition in order for democratization to succeed (e.g. Karl 1990 , Weiner 1987 , Huntington 1984 , Valenzuela 1989 ).
However, we have been unable to study interactive relationships involving several institutions affecting each other over longer sequential "chains", due to both a lack of systematic and comparable data across a global sample of countries extending over a large number of years, as well as methods appropriate for such an endeavor. For example, do powerful and active CSOs before holding of elections systematically reinforce the quality of subsequent elections, which then push MPs to hold governments to account? Current scholarship has little to say on how these institutions evolve in sequential terms.
Finally, most of the extant literature focus de-jure institutions. However, what really matters is how well such institutions are functioning in practice. High levels of de-facto accountability may have different causes and consequences than the mere de-jure introduction of institutions related to accountability. We will develop this notion more in detail in the following section.
The Implementation Gap: De-jure vs. De-facto Accountability
It has become conventional wisdom that there is an important difference between the introduction of de-jure institutions of accountability and their de-facto implementation (Besley 2006 : 37, Snyder 2006 . For instance, the Global Commission on Electoral Integrity (2012: 12) chaired by Kofi Annan pointed out that "many authoritarian governments (…) seek to wrap themselves in the veneer of democratic legitimacy." To this end, regimes introduce pro-forma institutions but skillfully strip them of their power to constrain the executive (Gandhi et al. 2009 ).
For example, almost 90 percent of countries in the world hold de jure multiparty elections for national office but less than half of these elections are substantially free and fair (HafnerBurton et al. 2013 : 152, van Ham & Lindberg 2016 ). Breaches range from election day manipulations such as stuffing ballot boxes and fabrication of results, to more subtle activities such as informal limitations on media freedom (Schedler 2002) . Such practices undermine two key preconditions for vertical accountability: procedural certainty and ex ante uncertainty (Przeworski 1986: 56-57) .
Another example is the media. Journalists are often severely restricted in practice even when freedom of expression and freedom of the press are constitutionally guaranteed. Russia is a contemporary example where non-coercive capture of key media outlets by the government effectively obstructs critical reporting (Besley et al. 2002: 720) . Although the Russian constitution formally guarantees freedom of the media, state-controlled companies own all national broadcasters, and journalists are in practice submissive to the regime.
Finally, most nations have parliaments with constitutionally guaranteed oversight functions. Yet, many cannot effectively exercise such de-jure prerogatives of scrutinizing the executive (Salih 2005 , Rakner and van de Walle 2009 , Vliet 2014 . To the contrary, authoritarian governments can use legislatures to co-opt elites and shield governments from criticism (Gandhi 2008) . In many African countries, limited implementation of constitutions and one-partydominance undermine the division between legislative and executive powers, which is necessary for horizontal accountability (Cranenburgh 2009: 64) .
Perhaps it will just take some time for these newer systems to develop effective institutions of accountability. Legislatures were introduced in many European countries already before the 20 th century, but it was not until much later that they actually developed the power to effectively oversee government. For instance, the German emperor established a national parliament with oversight rights in 1871, but a strong parliamentary oversight de-facto did not evolve until after World War II.
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The next section develops arguments about the sequence in which high levels of de-facto accountability develop over time. As a baseline approximation, it seems reasonable to assume that agents ' (governments) strategic interest is to remain as unconstrained as possible, while principals (accountability actors)
Closing the Gap: Sequences in the Evolution of Accountability
want to maximize the amount of control they exercise over agents, and hence seek to expand the reach of de-facto accountability mechanisms. The government then has to decide whether and to what extent to concede to this demand. In an iterative process, it weighs the costs of supplying accountability against the cost of suppressing the demand for accountability. This notion builds on Dahl's (1971: 14f) famous theoretical axiom that the likelihood of democratization increases as the cost of tolerating opposition decrease and the cost of repression increase. We also adopt the modification introduced by Lindberg (2009: 320) that what is relevant is not if the costs are higher or lower per see, but if that level of cost is acceptable or not to a particular ruling government.
Fig. 1. The probability of governments allowing the evolution of de-facto accountability
Note: This figure builds on Dahl (1971: 16) .
Thus, the evolution of specific patterns of accountability is a function of (1) how costly it would be for the government to supply improved institutions of accountability -meaning how much their room to maneuver would be constrained; and (2) whether governments perceive the cost it would incur to suppress the demand for specific types of accountability, as acceptable or not.
(1) The Cost of Supplying Accountability
Recall that we conceptualize accountability, following Schedler (1999) , to have two main dimensions: availability of information and power to enforce sanctions. Ultimately, both dimensions require that the offices of agents and principals are established, and the domain of authority of the agent. Here, we focus on how such institutions of accountability (e.g. elections, parliaments) evolve from being in place de-jure to being effective de-facto and functioning as fullfledged accountability actors. The three sub-types of political accountability -vertical, diagonal and horizontal -encompass varying mechanisms to constrain governments. We suggest here that because of this variation, one should expect that the sub-types vary in how effective they are in the information and sanctions dimensions. Consequently, supplying higher levels of de-facto accountability in these respective areas, are associated with varying costs for governments. Table   1 shows the pattern we expect. 
Sanctions

High Low High
Vertical accountability between citizens and government has a sharp edge as enforcement tool by voters' power to "throw the rascals out" at the ballot box if governments perform poorly.
The consequence of immediately losing power is drastic and we therefore consider the sanction capacity of vertical accountability high. However, it is also often considered a "long route" to implement accountability (World Bank 2004 (Mainwaring and Welna 2003) . Therefore, we consider the effectiveness of diagonal accountability to in the dimension of sanctions as low, whereas it is high in the dimension of information.
Finally, we argue that horizontal accountability, when realized in practice, is strong on both dimensions. First, it is difficult for governments to evade fully effective and independent horizontal oversight mechanisms. In most democracies the parliament is a key intermediary institution for probing the ruling government (Laver and Shepsle 1999) . Self-confident, independent and capacitated legislatures, high courts, and other oversight bodies have both institutional incentives and power to monitor the actions of the executive on a day-to-basis (Fish 2005) . They cannot be easily deceived and have ways of accessing information not available to ordinary citizens. For example, in many countries such as Sweden (National Audit Office) or the U.S (Government Accountability Office), independent courts of audit have the right to thoroughly scrutinize records of public expenditure. Their reports are important tools for parliamentarians and journalists to hold the government to account. Second, powerful parliaments -for instance through votes of non-confidence -and high courts through court rulings have the power to directly sanction the government.
Its dual characteristic of effective information and enforcement makes the implementation of full de-facto horizontal accountability highly costly for governments.
Additionally, institutions of horizontal accountability can constrain the government's day-to-day actions. Conversely, actors of vertical and diagonal accountability are further away from the center of power and therefore their effectiveness is less costly for governments.
(2) The Cost of Suppressing the Demand for Accountability
The cost of supplying accountability is only one side of the coin. Additionally, the cost of repressing the demand for accountability shapes the propensity of governments to make concessions. Since we study the accountability sequence, we are mainly interested in how advancements in one sub-type of accountability influence the demand for high-levels of de-facto accountability in others. It seems plausible that a strong demand is more costly to repress than a weak demand.
There is evidence that introducing institutions of vertical accountability -even if weakcreates a demand for more de-facto accountability of any kind. For example, Lindberg (2006) shows that the introduction of de-jure multiparty elections has pushed African countries towards greater respect for civil liberties. Gandhi and Lust Okar (2009: 415) argue that repeated participation in elections can change citizens' expectations towards political regimes, encouraging them to demand democratic procedures and broader participation. Furthermore, the regular holding of elections may prompt actors to believe that democracy is the new game in town, which gives them an incentive to them to adhere to democratic norms (Lindberg 2009: 335) . This includes holding the government to account. At the same time, political competition and a minimum level of press freedom enables civil society to push for better quality of government (Grimes 2013 ).
Building on these notions, we argue that improvements in vertical accountability can increase the demand for de-facto horizontal accountability, thus making it more costly for governments to repress such demands. For instance, MPs facing clean elections are more likely to insist that the legislature actually gains the power to oversee the government due to two pathways ( make it less costly for them to demand for more horizontal accountability. Due to both pathways, high levels of vertical accountability are likely to increase the demand for more horizontal accountability.
Fig. 2. Two pathways illustrating how vertical accountability can enhance the demand for horizontal accountability
South Korea is one example how vertical accountability can push for greater horizontal accountability. The first free and fair parliamentary elections in the country were held in 1988. Thus, we expect effective diagonal accountability to create a stronger demand for improved horizontal accountability. For instance, independent media outlets are able to give a platform to voices criticizing shortcomings in government oversight and for campaigns demanding more horizontal accountability. A well-informed, organized and active citizenry is likely to push for better governance such as more effective instruments of horizontal accountability (Grimes 2013: 381) . One successful example of diagonal accountability improving horizontal accountability is a campaign by Argentinian CSOs using the media to push for reforms in the judicial system in the country. The non-profit organization Asociación Por Los Derechos Civiles (ADC) led a coalition of CSOs in a campaign resulting in parliamentary and public hearings for Supreme Court of Justice nominees (Fisher 2013: 238) . Similarly, CSOs spearheaded judicial reforms at provincial level in Argentina. Several CSOs held a preparation course for judicial nominees for the provincial government of Santiago del Estero in 2008. As result, within one year, reportedly the selection of judges was removed from political control and now takes place under the auspices of the Council of Magistrates, and CSO monitoring (Fisher 2013: 239 ).
Thus, we expect self-confident CSOs to push for more transparency and better horizontal oversight of governments. Together with independent media this strengthens the demand for effective de-facto horizontal accountability.
Thus, our central argument is that the cost of suppressing the demand for more de-facto horizontal accountability depends on advancements in other sub-types of accountability. Conversely, the demand for de-facto vertical accountability does not depend as much on other sub-types. Key 
III. Summary and Hypotheses
To sum up, we argue that governments try to evade being held to account whereas accountability actors want more oversight power. Thus, the accountability sequence is shaped by the specific costs for governments of giving in to demands for accountability and the strength of these demands.
After the establishment of de-jure institutions of accountability, we expect the initial demand for high-levels of de-facto vertical accountability to be stronger than the demands for other sub-types. 7 However, note that in societies dominated by clientelism a "perverse accountability" relationship can be created between citizens and politicians, where citizens are dependent on clientelistic goods (Stokes 2005) . 8 Of course, a free media reporting about citizens' protests would help their advancement but this is not a necessary condition -particular in the digital age -as the recent Arab Spring protests illustrate. People of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya took to the streets in 2011 without much reporting in the official media outlets of their country.
The incentives and capacities of voters to demand are relatively independent from advancements in other sub-types, because -conversely to MPs -they are not at the dependent end of an accountability relationship. Giving in to demands for vertical accountability also carries limited costs for governments, because voters often lack accurate information about the behavior of elected officials, which limits their ability to effectively sanction government in elections.
Hence, in many cases the cost of repressing the demand for vertical accountability is higher than the cost of improving the electoral institutions. Thus,
H1: High levels of de-facto vertical accountability develop before high levels of other sub-types of de-facto accountability.
In the realm of horizontal accountability, institutions with the capacity to directly oversee and constrain governments are most costly for them. Therefore, governments may be ready to institutionalize parliaments and high courts, but can be expected to be reluctant to allow such institutions to become fully effective. Governments are only likely to make substantive concessions in this realm, if the demand would be too costly to repress. Advances in vertical and diagonal accountability intensifies this demand, because free and fair elections change the incentive structure of MPs and gives CSOs and media the opportunity to pressure for effective oversight. Hence,
H2: Institutions of horizontal accountability that directly oversee and constraint governments become de-facto fully
effective relatively late in the sequence -after progress in the diagonal and vertical sub-types.
IV. Concept and Measurement
Figure 3 maps our conceptualization of accountability and identifies a measurement scheme with a combination of factual and evaluative indicators. We distinguish between vertical, horizontal and diagonal sub-types of accountability. The distinction between vertical and horizontal accountability is commonly found in the literature (O'Donnell 1998). Other authors have added a third dimension -social accountability -to capture the important function of civil society and media in constraining governments (e.g. Melena et al. 2004 ). Here, we follow Goetz and Jenkins (2010) in terming this sub-type "diagonal," because this term better reflects its intermediary nature. For a more in-depth discussion see [reference blinded for review]. We also consider the de-jure existence of institutions potentially enabling accountability separate from the de-facto practice.
Fig. 3. Accountability and its sub-types
To measure de-facto accountability we primarily rely on V-Dem data, which draws on over 2,600 country experts (Coppedge et al. 2016a ). Version 6.2 of the V-Dem data set provides more than 350 distinct indicators on democracy and governance for 173 polities between 1900 and 2012. Data for 76 countries are available until 2015 and for 37 countries until 2014. V-Dem aggregates the expert assessments in a custom-built measurement model, which takes coder disagreement and measurement error into account (Pemstein et al. 2016) . 9 This enhances reliability and validity of the data. In the following analysis, unless explicitly mentioned, the data come from V-Dem. If V-Dem data on specific de-jure aspects is not available, we use data from the Comparative Constitution Project (CCP, Elkins 2014). We present a detailed description of the variables in Table A .1. in the Appendix. 9 The measurement model produces a probability distribution over country-year scores on a standardized interval scale (Coppedge et al 2016: 33) . As the sequencing models require ordinal variables, we use the transformed ordinal version of the V-Dem variables. Diagonal accountability reflects how civil society actors constrain the government either directly or indirectly via providing information for other accountability actors or pressurizing them (Goetz and Jenkins 2010) . Media empowers citizens to make informed political choices (Voltmer 2009: 139) . A robust civil society is a critical to hold governments accountable beyond elections (Besley 2006; Johnston 2005; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006) . In particular,
CSOs are important for increasing the political awareness and impact of their members (Lipset et al. 1956 ). When interpreting the results one should not draw any strong conclusions from small differences in the number of dependencies and contingency conditions presented in such a table, but we could draw inferences on sequence mechanisms from large differences (Lindenfors 2016: 24) .
One strong advantage of this method is that -unlike in time-series cross-section analysisthe sequencing approach does not focus on average effects. Rather, the analyses tells us that one aspect never emerged before another one -in our case never in the history since 1900, across some 17,500 country-years. This is arguably rather strong evidence that it is unlikely to ever happen. Thus, we can present evidence on which aspects develop first, in the middle, and last in the processes of building accountability.
Global Trends
The following analysis investigates how the 35 individual accountability indicators evolved in relation to one another in virtually all countries from 1900 to today. Table 3 presents the aggregate summary of 595 bivariate analyses following the dependency analysis approach outlined above, displaying the sum of contingency conditions for each of the variables reaching their highest value (the top category) with a 5% cut-off point. For selected indicators more detailed dependency tables can be found in Table A .3 in the Appendix.
The first thing to note is that almost all de-jure indicators have very few dependencies.
This reflects the fact that several countries had achieved most aspects of de-jure accountability before making much progress on any de-facto aspects. The only exception is the formal establishment of an ombudsman office, which comes relatively late in the sequence.
We expect de-facto vertical accountability to evolve first in the accountability sequence
(H1). Our findings partially support this hypothesis. Most indicators of de-facto vertical accountability require fewer contingencies than indicators of the horizontal and diagonal subtype. The sequence pattern demonstrates that improving vertical accountability by diminishing
Vote buying in elections can be achieved very early. Similarly, the evidence in Table 3 reveals that getting Multiparty elections de-facto and transforming Party linkages from clientelistic to programmatic can also be achieved very early in the sequence of developing the three types of accountability mechanisms. Second, full EMB autonomy requires more contingency conditions than all other aspects of vertical accountability and most indicators of diagonal accountability. Thus, the "last holdout" for governments in the area of vertical accountability seems to be influencing the management of elections. This is plausible, because restricting EMB autonomy is a low-cost way of manipulating elections (Schedler 2013:274) . We expect institutions of de-facto horizontal accountability that directly oversee and constraint governments to become fully effective de-facto relatively late in the sequence (H2).
Our findings support this hypothesis (Table 3 ). All indicators of diagonal and vertical accountability have fewer contingencies than the three key indicators of horizontal accountability.
They capture if it is likely that a) the legislature and b) other bodies (such as ombudsman, comptroller general or prosecutor) would conduct an investigation of the executive potentially leading to an unfavorable report or decision; and c) the likelihood that the high court would rule independently on cases salient to the government, regardless of the government's position. Table 3 provides evidence that no country has scored high on these three indicators without achieving significant progress in many other mechanisms of accountability. The legislature and other bodies can effectively hold the executive to account, and the high court can issue rulings independently only in an environment in which politicians are subject to regular and clean elections, citizens are free to organize themselves and express their political will through political parties and independent CSOs, and the media is able to scrutinize the work of the government. 12 This finding supports our second hypothesis that effective institutions of de-facto horizontal accountability develop last in the accountability sequence. Thus, the results from Figure 3 and 4, and Table 3 support the theoretical expectations that defacto diagonal and vertical accountability facilitates high levels of horizontal accountability.
How accountability evolved in Ghana
These general findings based on 115 years of data from 173 countries also tally well with country experiences. Consider, for example, Ghana that after eleven years of dictatorship, returned to an 
Regional and Time Trends
To assess the scope conditions of our findings we explore patterns of accountability development by time and by regions. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of electoral authoritarian regimes has surged. During the first and second wave of democratization this practice was not as widespread. It seems plausible that this trend is reflected in different sequencing patterns.
Therefore, we split the sample into two parts: One including all countries in 1988 or earlier and one with all countries after 1988. Based on the methods described above, Table 4 lists the defacto accountability indicators sorted in descending order with the indicators with the highest number of dependencies at the top of the list, and the lowest at the bottom.
Most key findings from the general patterns are similar to the results described for the global sample. In particular, it is noteworthy that the three mechanisms of horizontal accountability that directly oversee and constrain the degree of freedom of governments are on top of the dependency table for both before and after the Cold War. These aspects of horizontal accountability require most other aspects to be relatively highly developed de-facto in both time periods. Thus, the fundamental post-cold war transitions did not affect the reluctance of governments to give-in on these issues. Third, in the period after 1988 Lower court independence developed last in the sequence, whereas for the earlier time period it can be found in the middle of the dependency table. This finding suggests that countries that developed accountability after 1988 had to struggle with a legacy of weak low courts.
We also disaggregate the analysis by splitting the sample by world regions in order to investigate regional trends. Tables A.2 
VI. Conclusion
Our paper breaks new ground in understanding how governments become more accountable defacto focusing on three sub-types of accountability -vertical, horizontal and diagonal. We argue that governments are more likely to allow for de-facto accountability if the costs of supplying accountability decrease and the costs of suppressing the demand for accountability increase.
Based on this notion, governments are more likely to make initial concessions in the vertical subtype of accountability (voters, political parties), because this sub-type is less effective in directly constraining their actions and thus less costly than de-facto horizontal accountability (judiciary, MPs, other oversight bodies). Furthermore, since voters are not agents in accountability relationships their incentive to demand for more influence is less contingent on advances in other sub-types. Conversely, the incentive of MPs as key agents of horizontal accountability to demand for more oversight power increases with more vertical and diagonal accountability (CSOs, media).
Using novel sequencing methods, we present new evidence on how accountability has evolved in 173 countries from 1900 until the present. Our findings support our theoretical assumption and uncover the following empirical trends. High levels of de-facto accountability in the realm of vertical accountability can evolve before other types of accountability. Effective horizontal accountability is contingent on progress in vertical and diagonal accountability.
Without fully clean elections, autonomous opposition parties and a developed civil society and media, virtually no country in the world has ever achieved effective government oversight through independent high courts, vigorous parliaments or other institutions.
These findings have important policy implications. Efforts seeking to enhance horizontal accountability, such as the legislature's de-facto power, are very unlikely to be fully successful unless a series of other mechanisms of accountability are in place. International efforts to improve elections, the situation of opposition parties and media can have positive repercussions for other areas of accountability as well.
In sum, the novel sequencing methods utilized in this paper make an important contribution to our understanding of endogenous patterns of accountability evolution. Future research should also examine the role of exogenous factors -such as international interventions or economic development -in these sequential developments. Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair?
Appendix
V-Dem
Programmatic party links (v2psprlnks)
A party-constituent linkage refers to the sort of "good" that the party offers in exchange for political support and participation in party activities.
V-Dem
Opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut)
Are opposition parties independent and autonomous of the ruling regime? An opposition party is any party that is not part of the government, i.e., that has no control over the executive.
Clean elections (v2elfrfair) Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair?
Vote buying (v2elvotbuy)
Vote and turnout buying refers to the distribution of money or gifts to individuals, families, or small groups in order to influence their decision to vote/not vote or whom to vote for. It does not include legislation targeted at specific constituencies, i.e., "porkbarrel" legislation.
Horizontal accountability To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life?
Freedom of discussion (v2xcl_disc) This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.
Regional Trends
We split the sample by world regions in order to investigate regional trends. 1 Table A .2 lists the de-facto accountability indicators sorted in descending order with the indicators with the highest number of dependencies at the top of the list, and the lowest at the bottom.
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Key findings from the sequence of variables in the global sample hold across regions. The variables that necessitate the lowest number of conditions tend to be associated with vertical accountability (indicators displayed in red in the table); many diagonal accountability indicators (displayed in green) are concentrated in the middle of the table, and for most regions the indicators that come at the latest stage of development reflect horizontal accountability (blue indicators). Some exceptions to this pattern in Table 6 can also be found in the global sample: e.g. establishing autonomous EMB comes relatively late in time, while in some regions progress in terms of horizontal accountability, like financial independence of the legislature and judicial accountability, comes before reaching high levels on any other mechanisms of accountability. While the exact ordering sometimes varies a little, the indicators at the bottom, the middle, and at the top in the three types of accountability are the same as in the global analysis for most regions.
There are a number of interesting differences in the progress of accountability mechanisms across regions. First, in some regions no country has reached the highest level on all accountability indicators. These are crossed-out in Table A. 2. For example, no government has yet fully given up on media censorship or enabled the legislature to effectively investigate in practice in the MENA region (here including Turkey and Israel).
Second, the pattern of development of vertical accountability seems to differ across regions. In most regions, vote buying is eradicated relatively early. However, in Western countries as well as in the Caribbean, vote buying persists longer than other deficits in vertical accountability -with the exc eption of EMB autonomy, which has been fully realized relatively late in the sequence everywhere. EMB autonomy comes particularly late in the sequence in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, indicating that there governments have kept a backdoor for electoral manipulation open longer than other instruments for limiting accountability. Finally, Clean elections are achieved rather late in the MENA region (if at all) and unlike in other regions, countries from the Caribbean have not developed programmatic relationships between political parties and citizens early in the sequence.
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Thus, interventions to help make the EMB fully autonomous should be synchronized with efforts to strengthen the other mechanisms of vertical accountability too. On the other hand, vote buying is something that can be addressed early in most regions of the world where weak mechanisms of accountability is an issue, and regardless of the state of other mechanisms being in place or not.
There are also some interesting differences across regions with regards to horizontal accountability. Notably, no country from Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and South-East Asia has reached full judicial accountability -a measure of whether judges are held accountable for possible illegal actions -before making substantial progress in many other aspects of accountability. This is one instance where the disaggregated, regional analysis is very useful. Because of the fact that in a minority of regions (e.g. Western Europe) judicial accountability developed to a high degree early, the global analysis "hides" that in most of the regions it is actually an aspect of accountability that comes very late in the sequence.
Similarly, lower court independence was developed relatively late in the sequence in regions in the world covering a substantial number of countries (Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America, East and South Asia), but in other regions it had a relatively low number of contingency conditions. While the present analysis cannot provide an answer to why these regional differences occur, it is important to note these exceptions to the global pattern if and when the analyses here are used to make policy recommendations. 
